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Abstract 
The paper argues that the factors that determine treatment priority in socialized medicine, namely gravity of complaint 
and patient “importance” are similar to those that determine whether or not a frail banking system will be bailed out in 
a fixed exchange rate regime.
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     1.  Introduction 
 
What factors determine which patients receive emergency medical treatment in 
socialized medicine?  When resources are abundant, all patients seeking assistance are 
seen.  However, when resources are limited, as in Canada, then patients are assigned a 
priority status and some are turned away.  Apart from time of entry, what determines 
priority? Certainly the seriousness of the complaint matters.  However, while it has not 
been tested, an admitting physician may also have a “healthy” bias in favour of patients 
that he/she deems “important” in an economic or social sense.  Certainly, “importance” 
should not matter for all human life is of equal value and attention should be accorded 
first to the patient with the more life-threatening condition. However, if two patients are 
in a similarly dire situation, it is plausible that the healthcare practitioner will attend first 
to the political official, financial executive or even personal friend before the street 
urchin; just as it is likely that between two fortune-500 CEOs, attention will be accorded 
first to the patient with the more urgent situation.  Yes it seems that both patient 
importance and problem severity will determine emergency treatment. 
 
The present paper illustrates that the same factors that likely determine medical 
treatment priority, are similar to those that determine whether or not a banking system 
will receive a bail-out or “cash infusion” in a fixed exchange rate regime.  It is shown that 
if foreign exchange reserves are abundant (i.e., a bailout can be engineered without 
incurring a cost in terms of currency instability) then any banking sector or bank needing 
assistance will be bailed-out.  However, if foreign exchange reserves are insufficient to 
bailout banks without compromising the currency, then only very important and feeble 
banks will receive medical attention and be bailed out.   
 
The note proceeds as follows: In section 2, a framework is presented to determine 
how output and the exchange rate are affected when the central bank does and does not 
recapitalize a fragile banking sector.  The analysis is done for the cases in which central 
bank reserves are sufficient and then are not sufficient to recapitalize banks without 
compromising the currency peg.  A loss function is then specified to determine how 
policy makers will respond to bank fragilities given the level of foreign exchange 
reserves. It will be shown that in a constrained optimization (i.e., foreign exchange 
reserves are insufficient), only very sick and very important banking sectors (or banks) 
will be bailed out.  In a final section, the nineteen-nineties banking crises in China and 
Argentina are discussed to provide anecdotal support for the model. 
 
2.  Model 
 
To determine bailout likelihood, a simplified version of the framework used in 
Miller (2008) is presented.   The model is based on the following five equations: 
 
€ 
m− p =α −γi                                                                        (1) 
€ 
p = p*+e                                                                              (2) 
€ 
i = i*+ρ(χ),ρ ≥ 0,ρ'> 0,ρ(0) = 0                                         (3) 
€ 
m = ln(R+ D)                                                                       (4)   2 
 
€ 
y = ˜  y −δi                                                                            (5) 
 
The first two equations are the standard money market equilibrium condition and 
purchasing power parity respectively.  m is the log of the money supply which equals the 
sum of  central bank foreign exchange reserves, R, and domestic credit, D, as shown in 
equation (4).  p is the price level, e the exchange rate, i, the domestic interest rate and, y 
and ỹ are actual and “natural” levels of output respectively.  All lower case variables 
except interest rates are in logs and asterisks indicate foreign variables. 
 
Equation (3) is the modified interest parity condition assuming perfect capital 
mobility and instantaneous price adjustment.  It includes a risk premium, ρ, which is an 
increasing function of χ, the amount by which the banking sector is undercapitalized.  
The premium represents bankruptcy or insolvency fears.  Finally, equation (5) is the 
output equation and demonstrates that interest rate hikes reduce output.  δ in that equation 
measures output’s sensitivity to interest rate changes and will be larger the more 
important the banking sector for financing economic transactions. 
 
As i* and p* do not play a role in the analysis that follows, both are set equal to zero.  
Thus, substituting equations (2), (3) and (4) into equation (1), yields equation (6), the 
relationship between the central bank’s monetary policy, the risk premium and the 
equilibrium exchange rate. 
 
€ 
ln(R+ D)−e =α −γρ(χ)                                                     (6)  
 
Before any unfavorable shock to capital adequacy ratios, equation (6) is  
 
€ 
ln(R0 + D0)−e =α                                                              (7) 
 
where a 0 subscript indicates a starting value and ē is the officially fixed exchange rate.   
 
Equation (7) is the economy’s starting point.  Then, the representative banks become 
short an amount χ0, for their capital ratios to be adequate and so the risk premium to 
ρ(χ0)=ρ0.  Asset market equilibrium can then be reestablished by either a decrease in the 
money supply, an increase in the exchange rate and/or a decrease in the risk premium. 
Notice that the more important (i.e., the larger γ) and the sicker (i.e., the larger ρ) the 
banking sector, the more the money supply must decrease or the exchange rate increase 
to clear asset markets. We now examine which of these adjustments will occur in each of 
the policy options available to central banks:  Doing nothing or recapitalizing/bailing-out 
banks by printing money. For expositional purposes, it is assumed that a decrease in the 
money supply of X0  will cause the interest rate to increase by ρ0 and that an amount Z0 of 
new capital is needed to fully recapitalize banks. Z0 will be an increasing function of ρ0.  
For simplicity, X0 is assumed to be less than R0. The reader is referred to Miller (2006 
and 2008) to see how the analysis may change if this assumption is relaxed.  
   3 
We now consider the effects of the two policies:  First, for the case in which reserves 
are sufficient to recapitalize banks without causing a violation of the fixed parity; and 
then for the case that a bailout will compromise the peg.    
 
If  R0>Z0, then the central bank can adopt either policy without compromising its 
currency peg.  However, new credit must be extended to banks for the premium to revert 
to zero. If the central bank does nothing, then capital will flow out of the economy until 
the interest rate increases by ρ0.  Here the money supply will fall to R0+D0 –X0 and the 
risk premium will remain positive.  If on the other hand, the central bank lends new 
domestic credit to banks, then while the domestic credit component of the money supply 
will increase to D0+Z0, as the premium will be zero, the equilibrium money supply will 
remain equal to its starting value.  Thus, the increase in central bank credit will be offset 
by an equivalent decrease in foreign exchange reserves of Z0.  That is for the case that 
R0>Z0, output will be ỹ and ỹ-γρ when the central bank does and does not bail-out banks 
respectively.    
 
    If on the other hand, foreign exchange reserves are insufficient to recapitalize 
banks, then R0 will be less than Z0.  Here, the central bank will be unable to fully 
recapitalize banks without compromising the currency peg.  If the central bank does 
nothing, then again capital will flow out of the economy until interest rates increase by 
ρ0.  Since X0 is assumed to be less than R0, the outflow will not compromise the peg.  The 
money supply will again fall to R0+D0 –X0, output will be given by ỹ-γρ and the 
exchange rate will remain fixed and equal to ē.   
 
If instead of doing nothing, the central bank uses new domestic credit to fully 
recapitalize banks, then the premium will revert to zero.  However, as domestic credit 
will be higher than initially and foreign exchange reserves can only fall to zero, the 
exchange rate will have to increase to clear asset markets.  In the case of a bailout with 
insufficient reserves, output and the exchange rate will be given by ỹ and ln(D0+Z0)-α 
respectively.  It is readily verifiable that this exchange rate is greater than ē. 
 
To ascertain how policy-makers will react to a drop in capital adequacy ratios, the 




L = (y − ˜  y )
2 + C, C = 0 for e = e 
C = c for e > e 
                                             (8) 
 
Equation (8) indicates that policy-makers wish to keep output close to its natural level 
and suffer a loss of credibility if the currency peg is violated. 
 
  Substituting the above findings into equation (8), we can now calculate the loss 
associated with each of the policy responses available to the central bank when reserves 
                                                 
1 Here it is implicitly assumed that today’s policy response does not affect future bank behavior and so we 
completely abstract from moral hazard considerations.  For a paper which looks at how policy-maker 
objective function affects bank behavior see Miller (2008).   4 
are and are not sufficient.  Assuming first that foreign exchange reserves are sufficient to 
recapitalize banks, the losses associated with the two policy options are LNS=(δρ0)
2 and 
LDS=0, the loss of doing nothing and then the loss of doing something when reserves are 
sufficient. As the loss of doing something is trivially less than the loss of doing nothing, 
the central bank will always respond to any loss of bank solvency and bailout banks when 
resources are abundant.  That is when the demands on the system are not too demanding 
and resources are sufficient, then all patients will receive medical attention. 
 
If, on the other hand, foreign exchange reserves are insufficient to recapitalize 
banks (i.e., R0‹ Z0), then the results are less clear.  Substituting the resulting values for 
output for this scenario into equation (8) and given that e›ē, the losses associated with the 
policies are LNI= (δρ0)
2, the loss of doing nothing, and LDI = c, the loss of doing 
something when reserves are insufficient.  Thus, if (δρ0)
2›c, then a capital infusion will be 
administered.  Otherwise, the “patient” will be denied treatment.  In other words, for a 
given credibility cost of printing money, the more important and ill the banking sector, 
the more likely a bailout will occur when reserves are limited.   Moreover, as Z0 is an 
increasing function of ρ0, the sicker the banking sector, the more likely resources will be 
insufficient.   
 
3.  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Above we argued that extrapolating from moral hazard considerations, the same 
factors that determine medical treatment priority in socialized medicine (i.e., severity of 
affliction and patient importance), are similar to those that determine whether or not the 
banking sector will be bailed out in a fixed exchange rate regime.  It was shown that 
when resources are abundant (i.e., R0> Z0) and so there is a no “cost” of recapitalizing 
banks, then a banking sector needing assistance will be bailed out (i.e., all sick patients 
will receive medical attention).  Moreover, as Z0 is an increasing function of ρ0, the less 
ill the banking sector, the more likely resources will be sufficient to bailout banks.  If 
however banks are very sick (i.e. ρ0 and Z0 are large), then resources will likely be 
insufficient and a bailout will only come at the cost of currency instability. When this is 
the case, then only the very ill (i.e., large ρ0) and very important (i.e., large δ) banking 
sectors will be bailed out at the expense of currency peg credibility.  
 
In the above analysis, it was implicitly assumed that there is one representative bank 
(i.e., banks are identical) and policy-makers decide whether or not to bailout the entire 
banking sector.  The analogy to healthcare is therefore imperfect since in a constrained 
healthcare system, physicians see as many patients as possible and turn away those with 
less pressing “emergency” situations when resources are constrained.  However, if we 
allow for heterogeneous banks, then the analogy can be made more exact.  
 
Let δ and ρ0 now denote economy-wide averages and Z0 the cost of bailing out all 
insolvent banks.  δi is then the economic importance of bank i, ρ0i is bank i’s risk 
premium and Z0i  denotes the cost of bailing out bank i.  Now allowing for banks of 
different sizes and frailties, if R0> Z0, then policy-makers will bailout all banks needing 
assistance.  If however R0< Z0, then policy-maker will bailout as many banks as possible   5 
without derailing the peg.  Such bailouts will be administered on an urgency and 
importance basis as determined by δiρ0i which measures the economic costs of bank i’s 
frailties.  Therefore, ordering banks according to the size of their δiρ0i, policy-makers will 
bailout those banks with largest δiρ0i until ∑Z0i just exhausts R0.  Letting ρ0’ and δ’ denote 
the modified economy-wide averages after initial bailouts have been administered, if 
(δ’ρ0’)
2›c then all other banks needing assistance may receive aide at the expense of the 
currency peg.  
 
  Anecdotal support for these assertions is provided by the nineteen-nineties 
banking crises in Argentina and China; two countries with highly credible exchange rate 
pegs. Many of China’s banks were frail and ailing throughout the nineteen-nineties.  At 
the end of 1998 China’s four large state-owned commercial banks which accounted for 
almost 70 percent of its banking system assets, were deemed insolvent and the net losses 
associated with their difficulties were estimated to reach 47% of GDP in 1999 (Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003).  Seen within the context of the model presented in the previous 
section, China’s ρ0 was extremely large. Moreover, banks are extremely important 
financial intermediaries in China’s as their deposits are more than 100% of GDP!  Thus, 
the economic costs of bank fragilities are great in China and its δ is large. Finally, the 
Bank of China’s foreign exchange reserves were so large during the period that it was 
able to bailout all of its state-owned banks without derailing its peg.  Hence, in 1998 the 
Bank of China administered a $32.6 billion bailout of its four state-owned banks leaving 
its yuan/dollar peg unchanged.
2 
 
  Throughout the nineteen-eighties and –nineties, the Argentine economy also 
suffered a series of banking crises.  However, central bank foreign exchange reserves 
were insufficient for a money financed bailout of the entire banking sector and the 
continued functioning of its currency peg was seen as crucial for its newly obtained 
credibility and economic reforms (i.e., C was large in the model).  Moreover, in 
Argentina, bank deposits are only around 20% of GDP and so banks are not as important 
financial intermediaries in Argentina as in China (i.e., Argentina’s δ is relatively small 
compared to China’s).  Finally, while state-ownership is also important in Argentina, 
Argentine banks tend to be smaller and homogeneous than their Chinese counterparts.  
Hence, many Argentine banks were allowed to collapse, merge or close during the 
nineteen-nineties.  However, when bank difficulties inflamed into a series of runs and 
deposit suspensions, ρ0i and ρ0 spiked and the losses of continued banking malaise 
outstripped those of lost credibility (i.e., (δρ0)
2 became greater than c).  Policy-makers 
therefore stepped in and launched a $7.7 billion dollar bailout of most of its banks in 
2002 that contributed to a collapse of its currency peg in the following days.   
 
  To conclude, the same factors that determine medical treatment priority in 
socialized medicine determine which banks receive a bailout or cash infusion in a fixed 
exchange rate system.   When resources are abundant, all patients needing assistance are 
seen without unreasonable delay.  However, when resources are limited, then patients 
with less pressing medical conditions or are of less “importance” are turned away, 
                                                 
2 The Bank of China again lent $45 billion of its foreign exchange reserves to its two largest banks in 2004 
(Economist Jan 2005).   6 
assigned long treatment delays or given some other discouragement to seeking 
emergency services.  In China, resources were sufficient to bailout the most important 
and frailest banks needing assistance and their situation was urgent.  Therefore, Chinese 
policy-makers bailed out their four largest banks without affecting their currency peg.  In 
Argentina, on the other hand, resources were insufficient to bailout all banks and so many 
banks were left to fail or close.  Moreover, many banks that were did receive treatment 
were given “band-aide” remedies such as mergers or take-overs.  However, when general 
sickness gave way to a full-blown epidemic, policy-makers stepped in with a bailout that 
cost them the peg.  That is resources had to be called in from other parts of the medical 
system or other government programs to prevent the epidemic from developing into 
pandemic.  
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